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 You can deposit up to $10,000 worth of bitcoin in any 7 ...

You can deposit up to $10,000 worth of bitcoin in any 7 ...

Bitcoin Canadian Subreddit

Let's talk about Bitcoin in Canada
[link]

Bitcoin USA

The official reddit Bitcoin Community for these United States of America!
[link]

PointsPrizes.com: Paid Surveys, Free Gift Cards, Make Money Online, Free Games, Work From Home

PointsPrizes allows users to earn money by completing paid surveys, offers such as email submits and downloading stuff. Once you've earned enough points you'll be able to claim a PayPal or Bitcoin payment. Alternatively you can claim a free gift card code.
[link]

How to add Money Inside your Account in the Money Making Machine with Bitcoin BTC from home with the Internet

How to add Money Inside your Account in the Money Making Machine with Bitcoin BTC from home with the Internet submitted by cryyptoexpert2020 to u/cryyptoexpert2020 [link] [comments]

How do I add money to my Microsoft.com account with Bitcoin?

I don't see the "Redeem Bitcoin" option. Would it be because I'm in Canada?
submitted by darkstar107 to btc [link] [comments]

How much money do you need to (hypothetically), to buy the whole order book for Bitcoin on Binance? Can you calculate this, by take the sum of the bids, add some % for invisible stop orders?

How much money do you need to (hypothetically), to buy the whole order book for Bitcoin on Binance? Can you calculate this, by take the sum of the bids, add some % for invisible stop orders?
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submitted by snarfi to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

How do I add money to my Microsoft.com account with Bitcoin? /r/btc

How do I add money to my Microsoft.com account with Bitcoin? /btc submitted by HiIAMCaptainObvious to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

How to add money to Bitcoin Vault?

Why can’t I add BitCoin to the Vault from my BTC wallet on coinbase? Do I actually have to buy some with USD for it to go in the Vault?
submitted by Eastonator12 to CoinBase [link] [comments]

How to add money to Microsoft using Bitcoin.

How to add money to Microsoft using Bitcoin. submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

What barriers would money changers face if trying to add Bitcoin? And how could they overcome them? Discussion.

One of my current issues with Bitcoin is the difficulty in buying or selling Bitcoins.
I could buy from my peers, in which case I have to schedule a meeting, pay above average prices, etc. Additionally such options are not available in several parts of the world.
Or I could use exchanges, in which case I have to pay high fees, and generally wait several days. (Also unavailable in several parts of the world)
In both the cases One ends up paying a minimum of several dollars in addition to Bitcoins current price(compared to a general currency exchange where fees amount to fractions of a percent), and have to wait for long periods of time(compared to exchanges where small transactions only take minutes).
Although new exchanges are opening up all the time(I think one just or is about to in Toronto for example), this is too slow a process, and if one could get small currency exchangers to start adding Bitcoin to their list of traded currencies, it could not only reduce transaction fees(wire transfer fee, withdrawal fee, markup in price), but also make Bitcoins far more usable for daily small expenses.
If for example I wish to buy a 7 dollar game subscription and do not possess a credit card all I would have to do would be take seven dollars and a few extra pennies to a money changer, have them send the bitcoins to my phone, and buy the pass online, compared to currently having to take seven dollars and an extra for transaction fees, and waiting several days for my bitcoins.
So if I were to ask a small exchange to add bitcoins to their roster, what problems would they face, and what solutions could I point out to them?
(Note; This question is not limited to US exchanges, but is meant to encompass exchanges is all sorts of countries from third to first world)
submitted by Goingforthslowly to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Proposal: The Sia Foundation

Vision Statement

A common sentiment is brewing online; a shared desire for the internet that might have been. After decades of corporate encroachment, you don't need to be a power user to realize that something has gone very wrong.
In the early days of the internet, the future was bright. In that future, when you sent an instant message, it traveled directly to the recipient. When you needed to pay a friend, you announced a transfer of value to their public key. When an app was missing a feature you wanted, you opened up the source code and implemented it. When you took a picture on your phone, it was immediately encrypted and backed up to storage that you controlled. In that future, people would laugh at the idea of having to authenticate themselves to some corporation before doing these things.
What did we get instead? Rather than a network of human-sized communities, we have a handful of enormous commons, each controlled by a faceless corporate entity. Hey user, want to send a message? You can, but we'll store a copy of it indefinitely, unencrypted, for our preference-learning algorithms to pore over; how else could we slap targeted ads on every piece of content you see? Want to pay a friend? You can—in our Monopoly money. Want a new feature? Submit a request to our Support Center and we'll totally maybe think about it. Want to backup a photo? You can—inside our walled garden, which only we (and the NSA, of course) can access. Just be careful what you share, because merely locking you out of your account and deleting all your data is far from the worst thing we could do.
You rationalize this: "MEGACORP would never do such a thing; it would be bad for business." But we all know, at some level, that this state of affairs, this inversion of power, is not merely "unfortunate" or "suboptimal" – No. It is degrading. Even if MEGACORP were purely benevolent, it is degrading that we must ask its permission to talk to our friends; that we must rely on it to safeguard our treasured memories; that our digital lives are completely beholden to those who seek only to extract value from us.
At the root of this issue is the centralization of data. MEGACORP can surveil you—because your emails and video chats flow through their servers. And MEGACORP can control you—because they hold your data hostage. But centralization is a solution to a technical problem: How can we make the user's data accessible from anywhere in the world, on any device? For a long time, no alternative solution to this problem was forthcoming.
Today, thanks to a confluence of established techniques and recent innovations, we have solved the accessibility problem without resorting to centralization. Hashing, encryption, and erasure encoding got us most of the way, but one barrier remained: incentives. How do you incentivize an anonymous stranger to store your data? Earlier protocols like BitTorrent worked around this limitation by relying on altruism, tit-for-tat requirements, or "points" – in other words, nothing you could pay your electric bill with. Finally, in 2009, a solution appeared: Bitcoin. Not long after, Sia was born.
Cryptography has unleashed the latent power of the internet by enabling interactions between mutually-distrustful parties. Sia harnesses this power to turn the cloud storage market into a proper marketplace, where buyers and sellers can transact directly, with no intermediaries, anywhere in the world. No more silos or walled gardens: your data is encrypted, so it can't be spied on, and it's stored on many servers, so no single entity can hold it hostage. Thanks to projects like Sia, the internet is being re-decentralized.
Sia began its life as a startup, which means it has always been subjected to two competing forces: the ideals of its founders, and the profit motive inherent to all businesses. Its founders have taken great pains to never compromise on the former, but this often threatened the company's financial viability. With the establishment of the Sia Foundation, this tension is resolved. The Foundation, freed of the obligation to generate profit, is a pure embodiment of the ideals from which Sia originally sprung.
The goals and responsibilities of the Foundation are numerous: to maintain core Sia protocols and consensus code; to support developers building on top of Sia and its protocols; to promote Sia and facilitate partnerships in other spheres and communities; to ensure that users can easily acquire and safely store siacoins; to develop network scalability solutions; to implement hardforks and lead the community through them; and much more. In a broader sense, its mission is to commoditize data storage, making it cheap, ubiquitous, and accessible to all, without compromising privacy or performance.
Sia is a perfect example of how we can achieve better living through cryptography. We now begin a new chapter in Sia's history. May our stewardship lead it into a bright future.
 

Overview

Today, we are proposing the creation of the Sia Foundation: a new non-profit entity that builds and supports distributed cloud storage infrastructure, with a specific focus on the Sia storage platform. What follows is an informal overview of the Sia Foundation, covering two major topics: how the Foundation will be funded, and what its funds will be used for.

Organizational Structure

The Sia Foundation will be structured as a non-profit entity incorporated in the United States, likely a 501(c)(3) organization or similar. The actions of the Foundation will be constrained by its charter, which formalizes the specific obligations and overall mission outlined in this document. The charter will be updated on an annual basis to reflect the current goals of the Sia community.
The organization will be operated by a board of directors, initially comprising Luke Champine as President and Eddie Wang as Chairman. Luke Champine will be leaving his position at Nebulous to work at the Foundation full-time, and will seek to divest his shares of Nebulous stock along with other potential conflicts of interest. Neither Luke nor Eddie personally own any siafunds or significant quantities of siacoin.

Funding

The primary source of funding for the Foundation will come from a new block subsidy. Following a hardfork, 30 KS per block will be allocated to the "Foundation Fund," continuing in perpetuity. The existing 30 KS per block miner reward is not affected. Additionally, one year's worth of block subsidies (approximately 1.57 GS) will be allocated to the Fund immediately upon activation of the hardfork.
As detailed below, the Foundation will provably burn any coins that it cannot meaningfully spend. As such, the 30 KS subsidy should be viewed as a maximum. This allows the Foundation to grow alongside Sia without requiring additional hardforks.
The Foundation will not be funded to any degree by the possession or sale of siafunds. Siafunds were originally introduced as a means of incentivizing growth, and we still believe in their effectiveness: a siafund holder wants to increase the amount of storage on Sia as much as possible. While the Foundation obviously wants Sia to succeed, its driving force should be its charter. Deriving significant revenue from siafunds would jeopardize the Foundation's impartiality and focus. Ultimately, we want the Foundation to act in the best interests of Sia, not in growing its own budget.

Responsibilities

The Foundation inherits a great number of responsibilities from Nebulous. Each quarter, the Foundation will publish the progress it has made over the past quarter, and list the responsibilities it intends to prioritize over the coming quarter. This will be accompanied by a financial report, detailing each area of expenditure over the past quarter, and forecasting expenditures for the coming quarter. Below, we summarize some of the myriad responsibilities towards which the Foundation is expected to allocate its resources.

Maintain and enhance core Sia software

Arguably, this is the most important responsibility of the Foundation. At the heart of Sia is its consensus algorithm: regardless of other differences, all Sia software must agree upon the content and rules of the blockchain. It is therefore crucial that the algorithm be stewarded by an entity that is accountable to the community, transparent in its decision-making, and has no profit motive or other conflicts of interest.
Accordingly, Sia’s consensus functionality will no longer be directly maintained by Nebulous. Instead, the Foundation will release and maintain an implementation of a "minimal Sia full node," comprising the Sia consensus algorithm and P2P networking code. The source code will be available in a public repository, and signed binaries will be published for each release.
Other parties may use this code to provide alternative full node software. For example, Nebulous may extend the minimal full node with wallet, renter, and host functionality. The source code of any such implementation may be submitted to the Foundation for review. If the code passes review, the Foundation will provide "endorsement signatures" for the commit hash used and for binaries compiled internally by the Foundation. Specifically, these signatures assert that the Foundation believes the software contains no consensus-breaking changes or other modifications to imported Foundation code. Endorsement signatures and Foundation-compiled binaries may be displayed and distributed by the receiving party, along with an appropriate disclaimer.
A minimal full node is not terribly useful on its own; the wallet, renter, host, and other extensions are what make Sia a proper developer platform. Currently, the only implementations of these extensions are maintained by Nebulous. The Foundation will contract Nebulous to ensure that these extensions continue to receive updates and enhancements. Later on, the Foundation intends to develop its own implementations of these extensions and others. As with the minimal node software, these extensions will be open source and available in public repositories for use by any Sia node software.
With the consensus code now managed by the Foundation, the task of implementing and orchestrating hardforks becomes its responsibility as well. When the Foundation determines that a hardfork is necessary (whether through internal discussion or via community petition), a formal proposal will be drafted and submitted for public review, during which arguments for and against the proposal may be submitted to a public repository. During this time, the hardfork code will be implemented, either by Foundation employees or by external contributors working closely with the Foundation. Once the implementation is finished, final arguments will be heard. The Foundation board will then vote whether to accept or reject the proposal, and announce their decision along with appropriate justification. Assuming the proposal was accepted, the Foundation will announce the block height at which the hardfork will activate, and will subsequently release source code and signed binaries that incorporate the hardfork code.
Regardless of the Foundation's decision, it is the community that ultimately determines whether a fork is accepted or rejected – nothing can change that. Foundation node software will never automatically update, so all forks must be explicitly adopted by users. Furthermore, the Foundation will provide replay and wipeout protection for its hard forks, protecting other chains from unintended or malicious reorgs. Similarly, the Foundation will ensure that any file contracts formed prior to a fork activation will continue to be honored on both chains until they expire.
Finally, the Foundation also intends to pursue scalability solutions for the Sia blockchain. In particular, work has already begun on an implementation of Utreexo, which will greatly reduce the space requirements of fully-validating nodes (allowing a full node to be run on a smartphone) while increasing throughput and decreasing initial sync time. A hardfork implementing Utreexo will be submitted to the community as per the process detailed above.
As this is the most important responsibility of the Foundation, it will receive a significant portion of the Foundation’s budget, primarily in the form of developer salaries and contracting agreements.

Support community services

We intend to allocate 25% of the Foundation Fund towards the community. This allocation will be held and disbursed in the form of siacoins, and will pay for grants, bounties, hackathons, and other community-driven endeavours.
Any community-run service, such as a Skynet portal, explorer or web wallet, may apply to have its costs covered by the Foundation. Upon approval, the Foundation will reimburse expenses incurred by the service, subject to the exact terms agreed to. The intent of these grants is not to provide a source of income, but rather to make such services "break even" for their operators, so that members of the community can enrich the Sia ecosystem without worrying about the impact on their own finances.

Ensure easy acquisition and storage of siacoins

Most users will acquire their siacoins via an exchange. The Foundation will provide support to Sia-compatible exchanges, and pursue relevant integrations at its discretion, such as Coinbase's new Rosetta standard. The Foundation may also release DEX software that enables trading cryptocurrencies without the need for a third party. (The Foundation itself will never operate as a money transmitter.)
Increasingly, users are storing their cryptocurrency on hardware wallets. The Foundation will maintain the existing Ledger Nano S integration, and pursue further integrations at its discretion.
Of course, all hardware wallets must be paired with software running on a computer or smartphone, so the Foundation will also develop and/or maintain client-side wallet software, including both full-node wallets and "lite" wallets. Community-operated wallet services, i.e. web wallets, may be funded via grants.
Like core software maintenance, this responsibility will be funded in the form of developer salaries and contracting agreements.

Protect the ecosystem

When it comes to cryptocurrency security, patching software vulnerabilities is table stakes; there are significant legal and social threats that we must be mindful of as well. As such, the Foundation will earmark a portion of its fund to defend the community from legal action. The Foundation will also safeguard the network from 51% attacks and other threats to network security by implementing softforks and/or hardforks where necessary.
The Foundation also intends to assist in the development of a new FOSS software license, and to solicit legal memos on various Sia-related matters, such as hosting in the United States and the EU.
In a broader sense, the establishment of the Foundation makes the ecosystem more robust by transferring core development to a more neutral entity. Thanks to its funding structure, the Foundation will be immune to various forms of pressure that for-profit companies are susceptible to.

Drive adoption of Sia

Although the overriding goal of the Foundation is to make Sia the best platform it can be, all that work will be in vain if no one uses the platform. There are a number of ways the Foundation can promote Sia and get it into the hands of potential users and developers.
In-person conferences are understandably far less popular now, but the Foundation can sponsor and/or participate in virtual conferences. (In-person conferences may be held in the future, permitting circumstances.) Similarly, the Foundation will provide prizes for hackathons, which may be organized by community members, Nebulous, or the Foundation itself. Lastly, partnerships with other companies in the cryptocurrency space—or the cloud storage space—are a great way to increase awareness of Sia. To handle these responsibilities, one of the early priorities of the Foundation will be to hire a marketing director.

Fund Management

The Foundation Fund will be controlled by a multisig address. Each member of the Foundation's board will control one of the signing keys, with the signature threshold to be determined once the final composition of the board is known. (This threshold may also be increased or decreased if the number of board members changes.) Additionally, one timelocked signing key will be controlled by David Vorick. This key will act as a “dead man’s switch,” to be used in the event of an emergency that prevents Foundation board members from reaching the signature threshold. The timelock ensures that this key cannot be used unless the Foundation fails to sign a transaction for several months.
On the 1st of each month, the Foundation will use its keys to transfer all siacoins in the Fund to two new addresses. The first address will be controlled by a high-security hot wallet, and will receive approximately one month's worth of Foundation expenditures. The second address, receiving the remaining siacoins, will be a modified version of the source address: specifically, it will increase the timelock on David Vorick's signing key by one month. Any other changes to the set of signing keys, such as the arrival or departure of board members, will be incorporated into this address as well.
The Foundation Fund is allocated in SC, but many of the Foundation's expenditures must be paid in USD or other fiat currency. Accordingly, the Foundation will convert, at its discretion, a portion of its monthly withdrawals to fiat currency. We expect this conversion to be primarily facilitated by private "OTC" sales to accredited investors. The Foundation currently has no plans to speculate in cryptocurrency or other assets.
Finally, it is important that the Foundation adds value to the Sia platform well in excess of the inflation introduced by the block subsidy. For this reason, the Foundation intends to provably burn, on a quarterly basis, any coins that it cannot allocate towards any justifiable expense. In other words, coins will be burned whenever doing so provides greater value to the platform than any other use. Furthermore, the Foundation will cap its SC treasury at 5% of the total supply, and will cap its USD treasury at 4 years’ worth of predicted expenses.
 
Addendum: Hardfork Timeline
We would like to see this proposal finalized and accepted by the community no later than September 30th. A new version of siad, implementing the hardfork, will be released no later than October 15th. The hardfork will activate at block 293220, which is expected to occur around 12pm EST on January 1st, 2021.
 
Addendum: Inflation specifics
The total supply of siacoins as of January 1st, 2021 will be approximately 45.243 GS. The initial subsidy of 1.57 GS thus increases the supply by 3.47%, and the total annual inflation in 2021 will be at most 10.4% (if zero coins are burned). In 2022, total annual inflation will be at most 6.28%, and will steadily decrease in subsequent years.
 

Conclusion

We see the establishment of the Foundation as an important step in the maturation of the Sia project. It provides the ecosystem with a sustainable source of funding that can be exclusively directed towards achieving Sia's ambitious goals. Compared to other projects with far deeper pockets, Sia has always punched above its weight; once we're on equal footing, there's no telling what we'll be able to achieve.
Nevertheless, we do not propose this change lightly, and have taken pains to ensure that the Foundation will act in accordance with the ideals that this community shares. It will operate transparently, keep inflation to a minimum, and respect the user's fundamental role in decentralized systems. We hope that everyone in the community will consider this proposal carefully, and look forward to a productive discussion.
submitted by lukechampine to siacoin [link] [comments]

[WTS] Auction Leftovers #1

Good morning!
I'm trying something new today - so let's see how this goes. (If it works, I'll do it again. It it doesn't, I won't waste anyone's time with it next time because it's a LOT of work.)
What we have here are the leftovers from yesterday's auction. I have heard from a few people that the buyer's premium and other fees the auctioneer adds on (so he can make money and pay for the auctions) are too high - so I'm offering them all here for sale individually.
No buyer's premiums. No additional fees. In fact, I'M OFFERING DISCOUNTS:
*All the World Silver is 10% off the listed price.
*All the World Non-Silver marked $1.00 are now $.75 each.
*FREE shipping for any order over $100.
Each lot was individually imaged (front and back) for the auction - so the easiest way for you to see exactly what you're buying is to visit the auction link (the auction is over, so I'm not advertising anything different or advertising an upcoming auction) - so here that is:
https://www.auctionzip.com/auction-catalog/Coins-US,-Foreign-,-Rare,-Graded,-Type,-Jewelry,-More-3_Q37IBJZ4W1/?page=0&searchWithAll=&size=200&sort=
Here is the required "prove you still have the stuff" photo with the username card and today's date (I pulled the first five items out of the storage trays so you weren't just seeing the tops of bags):
PHOTO
Payment: PayPal. I do not have Venmo/Zello/Bitcoin or any other form of digital payment at this time.
Shipping: I will charge you what it costs me for the USPS label rounded up to the nearest dollar. For First Class that is usually $4, for USPS Priority Mail Flat Rate Small Box it will be $9. I will get you a tracking number right after payment is received and will get your package scanned into the USPS system within 24 hours of receipt of payment.
What do YOU need to do to buy coins from this group: send me a list of which lots you want (for example, I want to buy lots # 51, 52, 53, 54, 55) and I will send you a total.
I will do my absolute best to update the ad as soon as lots sell.
World Silver (10% off listed price!)
51 World Silver - Philippines 1944 S 50 Centavos $8.00
52 World Silver - Philippines 1944 S 50 Centavos $8.00
53 World Silver - Philippines 1944 S 50 Centavos $8.00
54 World Silver - Philippines 1944 D 20 Centavos $3.00
55 World Silver - Philippines 1944 D 20 Centavos $3.00
56 World Silver - Philippines 1944 D 20 Centavos $3.00
57 World Silver - Belgium 1909 1 Frank $5.00
58 World Silver - Philippines 1944 D 20 Centavos $3.00
59 World Silver - Philippines 1944 D 20 Centavos $3.00
60 World Silver - Philippines 1944 D 20 Centavos $3.00
61 World Silver - Philippines 1944 D 10 Centavos $2.00
62 World Silver - Philippines 1944 D 10 Centavos $2.00
64 World Silver - Philippines 1944 D 10 Centavos $2.00
65 World Silver - Australia 1942 (m) 1 Shilling BETTER DATE $5.00
66 World Silver - New Zealand 1941 1 Florin NICE $12.00
67 World Silver - Switzerland 1920 1/2 Franc $2.00
68 World Silver - Switzerland 1951 1/2 Franc $2.00
69 World Silver - Switzerland 1952 1/2 Franc $2.00
70 World Silver - Italy 1959 500 Lire $9.00
71 World Silver - Italy 1960 500 Lire $9.00
73 World Silver - Spain 1869 (69) SN-M 1 Peseta KEY DATE $25.00
74 World Silver - Sweden 1938 1 Krona $6.00
75 World Silver - France 1913 50 Centimes $2.00
76 World Silver - Hong Kong 1884 10 Cents $3.00
78 World Silver - Canada 1913 25 Cents $5.00
79 World Silver - Canada 1906 25 Cents $5.00
80 World Silver - Canada 1910 25 Cents $5.00
81 World Silver - Cyprus 1901 9 Piastres $10.00
82 World Silver - Canada 1917 25 Cents $5.00
83 World Silver - Canada 1918 25 Cents $5.00
84 World Silver - Canada 1888 10 Cents $3.00
85 World Silver - Canada 1906 10 Cents $3.00
86 World Silver - Canada 1916 10 Cents $3.00
87 World Silver - Canada 1918 10 Cents $3.00
88 World Silver - Philippines 1917 S 10 Centavos $2.00
89 World Silver - Canada (Newfoundland) 1942 C 10 Cents $3.00
90 World Silver - Guatemala 1894 2 Reales Pendant $5.00
92 World Silver - Great Britain 1917 3 Pence $2.00
93 World Silver - Great Britain 1917 3 Pence $2.00
94 World Silver - Great Britain 1916 3 Pence $2.00
95 World Silver - Great Britain 1919 3 Pence $2.00
97 World Silver - Great Britain 1920 3 Pence $2.00
98 World Silver - Great Britain 1916 3 Pence $2.00
99 World Silver - Caribbean Country 1915 20 Centavos $5.00
100 World Silver - Caribbean Country 1953 25 Centavos $5.00
252 World Silver - Great Britain 1918 3 Pence $2.00
253 World Silver - Switzerland 1945 1/2 Franc $3.00
254 World Silver - Switzerland 1950 1/2 Franc $3.00
255 World Silver - Switzerland 1953 1/2 Franc $3.00
256 World Silver - Switzerland 1975 1 Franc $8.00
257 World Silver - Switzerland 1903 1 Franc $5.00
258 World Silver - Switzerland 1958 1 Franc $6.00
259 World Silver - Great Britain 1919 3 Pence $2.00
260 World Silver - Great Britain 1916 3 Pence $2.00
261 World Silver - Great Britain 1919 3 Pence $2.00
263 World Silver - Australia 1914 (L) Sixpence $4.00
264 World Silver - Australia 1916 M Sixpence KEY DATE $15.00
265 World Silver - Australia 1919 M Sixpence $8.00
266 World Silver - Australia 1922 Sixpence $10.00
267 World Silver - Australia 1922 Sixpence $10.00
268 World Silver - Australia 1923 Sixpence $6.00
269 World Silver - Australia 1923 Sixpence $6.00
270 World Silver - Australia 1936 Sixpence $3.00
271 World Silver - Australia 1939 Sixpence $4.00
272 World Silver - Australia 1911 Shilling $5.00
273 World Silver - Australia 1912 Shilling $8.00
274 World Silver - Australia 1912 Shilling $10.00
275 World Silver - Australia 1914 Shilling $6.00
276 World Silver - Australia 1920 Shilling $8.00
277 World Silver - Australia 1920 Shilling $10.00
278 World Silver - Australia 1922 Shilling $6.00
279 World Silver - Australia 1928 Shilling $8.00
280 World Silver - Australia 1943 Shilling $10.00
281 World Silver - Germany (Bavaria) 1902 D 5 Marks $28.00
282 World Silver - Germany (Saxony) 1876 E 2 Marks $20.00
283 World Silver - Great Britain 1889 Sixpence $4.00
284 World Silver - Great Britain 1889 Sixpence $6.00
286 World Silver - Great Britain 1900 Sixpence $4.00
287 World Silver - Great Britain 1904 Sixpence $4.00
288 World Silver - Great Britain 1907 Sixpence $10.00
289 World Silver - Great Britain 1921 Sixpence $4.00
290 World Silver - Great Britain 1925 Sixpence NICE $12.00
293 World Silver - Germany (Prussia) 1849 A 1/6 Thaler $8.00
294 World Silver - Portugal 1933 2 1/2 Escudos KEY DATE $8.00
295 World Silver - New Zealand 1939 6 Pence $3.00
297 World Silver - Great Britain 1872 (14) Shilling $8.00
298 World Silver - Great Britain 1873 (81) Shilling $8.00
299 World Silver - New Zealand 1943 6 Pence $3.00
451 World Silver - Seychelles 1944 25 Cents (mintage 36k) $3.00
453 World Silver - Columbia 1874 10 Centavos LOW MINTAGE $4.00
454 World Silver - Guatemala 1899 1 Real $4.00
455 World Silver - Philippines 1868 20 Centimos $6.00
457 World Silver - Great Britain 1918 Shilling $6.00
458 World Silver - Great Britain 1924 Shilling $6.00
459 World Silver - Great Britain 1925 Florin KEY DATE $15.00
463 World Silver - Egypt 1917 2 Piastres $3.00
464 World Silver - Canada 1882 H Ten Cents $8.00
465 World Silver - Canada 1882 H Ten Cents $10.00
466 World Silver - Canada 1886 Ten Cents $15.00
467 World Silver - Curacao 1944 D 1/4 Gulden NICE $6.00
468 World Silver - Canada 1888 Ten Cents $8.00
469 World Silver - Canada 1891 Ten Cents $10.00
470 World Silver - Canada 1899 Ten Cents $8.00
471 World Silver - Canada 1902 Ten Cents $6.00
472 World Silver - Canada 1902 H Ten Cents $3.00
474 World Silver - Canada 1908 Ten Cents $4.00
476 World Silver - Canada 1908 Ten Cents $6.00
477 World Silver - Canada 1909 Ten Cents $4.00
478 World Silver - Canada 1909 Ten Cents $4.00
479 World Silver - Italy 1887 1 Lira $5.00
480 World Silver - Poland 1840 MW 10 Groszy $2.00
482 World Silver - Canada 1916 Ten Cents $3.00
485 World Silver - Norway 1898 50 Ore LOW MINTAGE $6.00
486 World Silver - Sweden 1877 25 Ore $6.00
487 World Silver - Germany (Empire) 1919 F 1/2 Mark $6.00
489 World Silver - Germany (Empire) 1918 F 1/2 Mark $6.00
490 World Silver - Canada 1948 Ten Cents $3.00
491 World Silver - Canada 1951 Ten Cents NICE $3.00
492 World Silver - Canada 1870 25 Cents $10.00
493 World Silver - Canada 1871 H 25 Cents $10.00
494 World Silver - Canada 1872 H 25 Cents $10.00
495 World Silver - Germany (Lippe) 1860 A 1 Silver Groschen $10.00
497 World Silver - Canada 1874 H 25 Cents $8.00
498 World Silver - Germany (Reuss-Schleiz) 1846 A 1 Silver Groschen (mintage 62k) $6.00
499 World Silver - Canada 1881 H 25 Cents $15.00
500 World Silver - Canada 1948 25 Cents $6.00
651 World Silver - Canada 1954 50 Cents NICE $9.00
652 World Silver - Canada 1903 25 Cents $8.00
653 World Silver - Canada 1904 25 Cents $8.00
654 World Silver - Canada 1905 25 Cents $8.00
655 World Silver - Canada 1905 25 Cents $8.00
656 World Silver - Canada 1907 25 Cents $6.00
657 World Silver - Canada 1908 25 Cents $8.00
658 World Silver - Austria - 1868 10 Kreuzer $2.00
659 World Silver - Canada 1912 25 Cents $6.00
660 World Silver - Canada 1916 25 Cents $6.00
661 World Silver - Canada 1916 25 Cents $8.00
662 World Silver - Spain 1892 (92) 50 Centimos $3.00
663 World Silver - Canada 1921 25 Cents $8.00
664 World Silver - Canada 1921 25 Cents $8.00
665 World Silver - Norway 1899 25 Ore $8.00
666 World Silver - Canada 1931 25 Cents $6.00
667 World Silver - Canada 1931 25 Cents $8.00
669 World Silver - Russia 1879 20 Kopeks $4.00
672 World Silver - Germany (Prussia) 1856 A 1 Silver Groschen $3.00
673 World Silver - Germany (Empire) 1877 F 50 Pfennig $10.00
675 World Silver - Germany (Empire) 1918 D 1/2 Mark NICE $3.00
677 World Silver - Switzerland 1955 1/2 Franc BETTER DATE $4.00
678 World Silver - Germany (Empire) 1911 A 1 Mark NICE $6.00
679 World Silver - Germany (Prussia) 1870 A 2 1/2 Silver Groschen $4.00
680 World Silver - Sweden 1875 ST 50 Ore $10.00
681 World Silver - Germany (Hesse-Darmstadt) 1842 6 Kreuzer $6.00
682 World Silver - Philippines 1918 S 20 Centavos $5.00
683 World Silver - Philippines 1919 S 20 Centavos $6.00
684 World Silver - Saint Thomas & Prince Island (Sao Tome et Principe) 1951 2 1/2 Escudos LOW MINTAGE $25.00
686 World Silver - Germany (Wurttemberg) 1833 6 Kreuzer $4.00
687 World Silver - Dominican Republic 1891 1 Franco $10.00
688 World Silver - Straits Settlements 1895 10 Cents NICE $12.00
689 World Silver - Straits Settlements 1910 10 Cents $5.00
690 World Silver - Straits Settlements 1919 10 Cents $3.00
691 World Silver - Germany (Empire) 1918 F 1/2 Mark NICE $15.00
692 World Silver - Great Britain 1915 Shilling NICE $12.00
693 World Silver - Japan 1899 20 Sen $6.00
694 World Silver - Japan 1932 50 Sen $6.00
697 World Silver - Canada 1929 10 Cents $3.00
700 World Silver - Canada 1948 10 Cents $3.00
851 World Silver - Egypt 1916 5 Piastres $6.00
852 World Silver - South Africa 1962 20 Cents $6.00
854 World Silver - Egypt AH1293 (Year 10; 1884) 10 Qirsh $12.00
857 World Silver - Panama 1931 1/10 Balboa $5.00
861 World Silver - Egypt AH1327 (1910-1913) 5 Qirsh $6.00
863 World Silver - Turkey AH1327 (Year 6; 1914) 5 Kurush $6.00
864 World Silver - Turkey AH1293 (Year 24; 1898) 2 Kurush $3.00
865 World Silver - Egypt AH1384 (1964) 5 Piastres $3.00
867 World Silver - Syria (United Arab Republic) 1959 50 Qirsh $4.00
869 World Silver - Great Britain 1834 Sixpence $8.00
870 World Silver - Great Britain 1859 Sixpence $8.00
871 World Silver - Great Britain 1866 (53) Sixpence $8.00
874 World Silver - Great Britain 1835 1/2 Crown (LOW MINTAGE) $20.00
875 World Silver - Australia 1917 M Sixpence $12.00
876 World Silver - Australia 1920 M Sixpence $10.00
877 World Silver - Australia 1912 Shilling $12.00
878 World Silver - Australia 1913 Shilling $12.00
879 World Silver - Australia 1914 Shilling $6.00
880 World Silver - Australia 1925/3 Shilling $6.00
882 World Silver - Australia 1914 Shilling $6.00
885 World Silver - Morocco AH1380 (1960) 1 Dirham NICE $6.00
886 World Silver - Canada 1902 10 Cents $6.00
887 World Silver - Canada 1908 10 Cents $5.00
891 World Silver - Canada 1949 10 Cents $3.00
892 World Silver - Canada 1882 H 25 Cents $20.00
893 World Silver - Canada 1902 H 25 Cents $10.00
894 World Silver - Canada 1903 25 Cents $10.00
895 World Silver - Canada 1909 25 Cents $10.00
896 World Silver - Canada 1912 25 Cents $8.00
899 World Silver - Canada 1948 25 Cents $6.00
World Non-Silver (If it's listed at $1.00, it's .75)
ALL BASE METAL SOLD, THANK YOU
THANK YOU AND HAVE A WONDERFUL DAY!
submitted by stldanceartist to Coins4Sale [link] [comments]

Everyday info sec, hardcore info sec, and DNMs

Edit: Since first post I have updated a few sections with additional information.
I recommend reading it all even if it is very long, I might have placed some relevant info in different sections while thinking about what else needed to be added, plenty of steps remains mostly the same except when I comment directly on it. It is not necessary to do 100% security all the time, unless you absolutely need it, combining some high and some lower security ideas for a balance of security and convenience is useful.
I will base this mostly on Windows, Linux users probably know this, and I have no idea how apple machines work (tho many things in here are still relevant for other operating systems, as they are just general tips)
Disclaimer: There are certainly other steps that can make you more anonymous or safer, however I think for most people this will surfice. Any software I recommend should be independently verified for security, and examples of software are not to be taken as endorsements. I simply use examples and give recommendations when I believe it necessary, or helpful.
I will not really differentiate between anonymity and security, they are often the same thing. As such the word security can mean either more anonymous, less vulnerable, or both.
--------
Everyday Simple Info Sec:
-There could be a hidden administrator user on your PC, make sure to change its password
(Snapchat msgs, reddit dms, discord msgs, are just a few examples of msgs that are never encrypted)
-Any info even send in encrypted msgs (and obviously non encrypted) should still be kept with possible deniability, don't say "I'm gonna do MDMA", say "I'm going out with molly."
-DO NOT STORE ANY PASSWORDS ON GOOGLE, IF GOOGLE LOGIN IS AUTHENTICATED IT WILL AUTFILL ALL PASSWORDS IT HAS SAVED (same with other similar services) (This means if you are logged in to chrome and someone has access to your machine, they can auto fill passwords without entering a single password)
-use a rememberable passphrase, especially for your master key ring aka password manager A long sentence that is memorable makes an okay password (decent example,: "I met my wife at Little Ceasers for the first time on 07/09/20" better even if it's just something you know, if its impersonal, and if you can add special characters or numbers that you won't forget) (A better example for a passphrase is: "There is 0nly 0ne letter that d0esn’t appear in any U.S. state nameQ")
-Purge your internet activity frequently, there's a reason why I only have one post, and a few comments appearing in my account, but thousands of kama. Exposing information needlessly is not good.
-Never post private information publicly, and if you do, do it vaguely as possible. (Example: Not "I'm 15", say "I'm a teenager") Do not post any vital information ever, no birthdays, mother's maiden name, age, or anything you have ever seen in a security question. Never post your current activities while they are ongoing. You going on a vacation? Don't announce it to the world, taking picture there? Post them when you are home.
-Rethink how you do security questions. Many answers to security questions can be found in your internet history. One could use the first word of the security question as an answer, or a different sceme that will mean you always remember it. (Security question need to go, the amount of personal info an average person puts on the internet makes it easy to attack anything using security question)
-------_
High level crimimal information security:
The motto here is, "All the Security, All the Time" As one fuck up can end with you leaving a lick of traceability, and you could be fucked.
Pre Note: All of your software should always be up to date. Also even perfect info sec does not guarantee you are completely safe, a new zero day (exploit) can still fuck you, but good info security makes you significantly safer, by eliminating as many attacks as possible.
-Get a new device (or make a already owned device seem like you never owned it, do this only if you know how to, there's a lot of stuff that goes into that, like changing your mac adress etc) buy with cash, and your face covered, preferably far away from where you live. (Do I need to specify to not bring your phone or anything else that tracks your location to anywhere you want to go anonymously?) (Be aware that even hardware can have vulnerabilities, many cpus have known vulnerabilities, I can't list them all, do some research before buying)
-If you know how to use Tails (A linux distro designed for Info sec) use that, preferably on a USB. (Or learn how to use tails, its better, but complicated) Otherwise a clean copy of windows (make sure its not in any way associated with you) can do the job too, tho not as well. (Using a VM might give extra security, since VMs usually erase all data and RAM they were using on shutdown)
-Get a non tracking VPN, Enable the kill switch (a setting that disables all traffic that doesn't go through the VPN) (change your firewall settings to only allow the traffic from the VPN, windows guide (Change settings so only traffic from the tor application is send) Edit: (Due to complaints: do not use vpn over tor, use tor over vpn. tor over vpn has no notable downside, if the VPN logs it makes no difference, your ISP will always log anyways, and vpns remove other attack vectors and also provide backup security should tor fail. Again even if the VPN tracks you only change the people doing the tracking, but now you are further removed making it more anonymous and also with less vulnerabilities)
-rember privacy settings, cookie cleaner, and antivirus, password (There could be a hidden administrator user on your PC, make sure to change its password)
-Always use the device on a non admin account
-Ideally use this device only on networks that are not connected with you. Such as public networks (try to never use the same public networks twice, move around) (a home network should be fine now, as it should never be exposed, but more security is always better) (Its just a conveniences vs security trade)
-Never use accounts that have been exposed to lower security on higher security machines
-your browser is now TOR (or your preferred security focused browser, if you dont plan on using onion ) Make sure you get the standalone version of tor not the addon build (the standalone is safer, because there are less settings and options to tweak)
-Change your tor settings, to safest mode, enable a bridge (to my knowledge there's no difference in security between the build in bridges in tor), enable automatic updates, set duckduckgo onion as your primary browser. Set dark.fail onion page as your home page. (Or your preferred privacy search engine and onion directory)
-------_
How to use dark net markets (DNMs)
If you finished your High Security setup, we can dive right in. Otherwise go do that. This is where all that is essential.
Quick info on Tor, and onion sites. There is no search engine. It's all based of directories and addresses you are given by others. Tor will likely not be very quick, it has to pass through multiple networks to get to the destination. DNMs sometimes exit scam, an exit scam is when a market shuts down completely and takes all the money, this is a risk when using DNMs, it's not too common but happens maybe 0-4 times a year. The admins of thoese servers need to get out at some point, before they get jailed, so they exit the game, and scam everyone out of their money.
-A very useful onion directory is dark.fail it has a lot of links, for all kinds of stuff. News, email, DNMs, Psychonautwiki (harm reduction website), forums etc. (Other directories also exist)
-Pick a market, preferably one that handles secure connection server side instead of requiring you to establish the secure connection. Then create an account. Your account once created should include an entry box in your profile for a pgp key, post your PUBLIC key in there. (Verify the link is not a scam, most markets should provide a pgp signature)
-Next is currency setup. All major cryptocurrency exchangers can be used, I can recommend coin base but there could be better ones out there. Unless you find a small non U.S., exchange, they will always ask for your identity. So unless you can find a trustworthy exchange that doesn't ID, you will need to give it to them. (Side note, all major crypto exchangers report to the IRS, if the IRS asks you if you bought cryptocurrency and you bought while having IDed yourself SAY YES, DO NOT COMMIT TAX FRAUD WHEN THEY KNOW YOU DID)
-Transfer (monero you can send directly, btc you should scramble) to your wallet. There are two options a cold wallet (physical) or a software wallet. Software wallets usually dont cost anything so I recommend them, even if often less safe. Electrum is easy to use, and pretty safe. You can also do your own research and find a wallet that fits your needs.
-now you are ready to buy, only buy using escrow (it means the money is held by the market as a middle man until the product is delivered, they will also handle any issues like wrong quantity, cuts, etc), judge the reviews for a product, and if available look at the history of the vendor, until you find a product from a vendor you trust. (I recommend to buy within your country as much as possible, so it doesn't go through customs, it's very rare that something is found, but it can happen)
-now you get to buy, depending on market, you either have cryptocurrency stored in their wallets (not recommend, you will lose it in an exit scam) or you can send it every order. When you send your delivery adress (or the one you want it to go to) encrypt the adress using the sellers public key. Make sure the adress is correct.
-wait for the product, make sure to extend the escrow until the product arrives, if you can't extend it anymore dispute the order, and a moderator will step in
-test the product, use it, and leave a review. PLEASE LEAVE A REVIEW, DNMs only work because of reviews.
Edit: Didn't imagine I would write over 15000 words. Oh well, it was fun. Hope it helps, if you have any questions feel free to ask.
No idea how long this will stay up, I might purge it in 7 days, or never.
submitted by seven_N_A7 to u/seven_N_A7 [link] [comments]

A guide to Popcorn Time [For beginners]

A guide to Popcorn Time [For beginners]

Popcorn Time takes its inspiration from Netflix, boasting a clean outlook with thumbnails and categories - And streams pirated copies of movies and shows to your computer or smartphone


Editors note: There are many fake versions of Popcorn Time. This article primarily use Reddit as its source to recommend and link to the official, well regarded, version of the app.
When you think of movie streaming, services like Hulu, Disney+, and Netflix usually come to mind. However, there is another streaming platform that is particularly popular for streaming pirated movies: Popcorn Time. This streaming platform allows you to watch torrented and pirated movies without paying anything. All you need to do is install it on your PC/smartphone/tablet, search for a film, and click play. However, there are piracy and safety concerns when it comes to using Popcorn Time. This is how it works.

Index

  • What Exactly is Popcorn Time?
  • How it Works
  • How to Install Popcorn Time
  • Which version is legit?
  • Where does popcorn time store movies?
  • Popcorn Time APK for Android
  • Is Popcorn Time available on iOS?
  • Is it Illegal to Use Popcorn Time?
  • How does the developers make money?
  • Popcorn Time alternatives
  • Summary

What Exactly is Popcorn Time?

Popcorn Time is an open-source, multi-platform BitTorrent software application with a stylish and attractive media player. It was initially released in March 2014 by a team of developers in Argentina. They wanted to create a software that allows users to stream video content from torrent. Popcorn Time takes its inspiration from Netflix, boasting a clean outlook with thumbnails and categories. It uses sequential downloading and uploading to play movies, hence allowing you to stream pirated movies instantly.

Popcorn Time on the Mac

How it Works

Popcorn Time is a torrent based streaming tool and the way it works is simple enough. Let’s say you want to watch Tenet (it's not out as of this writing). You use the interface provided by the platform to find and click that title, and the tool then navigates through existing BitTorrent titles automatically from come from two well known torrent sites. YTS for movies and eztv for tv-shows. Then, Tenet is streamed directly to your computer from that pre-existing BitTorrent source. So, while you watch the film, Popcorn Times acts as a torrent client and continues to leech and seed it from other people. That means you'll be forced to share the content you watch.

How to Install Popcorn Time?

In order to use Popcorn Time to stream pirated movies, you will need to download and install the software on your computer or smartphone. The app is available for variety of operating systems, including Android, Linux, Windows, Mac, etc.
  • Download Popcorn Time from popcorntime.app which hosts Mac, Windows and Android.
  • There are no specific installation requirements as it is installed just like any other app.
However, keep in mind that its usage has been banned in many regions. So, you cannot download it from Apple’s Apple Store or Google Play Store. In some countries popcorntime.app has been blocked and you need a VPN to hide your real IP. You might want to use VPN software to keep your own information private and anonymous when running the app as well.

Which version is legit, and real?

There are many clones out there, some of which will install other apps, using your computer as a bitcoin miner.
The legit, and most supported version according to Reddit, is popcorntime.app (formerly known as popcorntime.sh)

Where does popcorn time store movies?

On your computer or device. Using torrents the app stream the files, while they are being downloaded. So it's just like when you download a torrent, except it starts the video during the download.

Popcorn Time APK for Android

One of the most popular usage of Popcorn Time is its Android version, and the recently relaunched Android TV version. The most popular and liked version comes from popcorntime.app which is also the officially supported version on Reddit.

Is Popcorn Time available on iOS?

Yes. But it's not as easy as downloading an app from the App store.The iPhone version of Popcorn Time is unstable and requires a jailbroken iPhone. Since jailbreaking your iPhone in 2020 is difficult and time consuming, it isn't an option for most. If you still want to try, there is Antique's version. You can follow his updates and links on Twitter. There is also a version which allegedly works with the alternative, non-jailbreak required, but much debated, altstore. For more information, see its Github home.

Is it Illegal to Use Popcorn Time?

In most cases, yes.
Most, if not all, TV shows and movies which appear on Popcorn Time are pirated, and you may be wondering about the legality of it all. First of all, downloading any copyrighted file is illegal in most countries. However, torrents themselves are a valid means to share and download files. So without sounding too confusing, it is typically not illegal to download Popcorn Time. It's when you stream or download the movies and tv-shows themselves it gets risky. But depending on where you live this might not be the case. Copyright infringement is illegal in Germany while in India, there are no restrictions of using Popcorn Time to steam movies as long as you don’t redistribute them. Of course, laws change. That’s why it is recommended that you do your research to understand the risks.

How does the developers make money?

The Popcorn time version we recommend has affiliate links to VPN services. How much money this actually is, or if its funding hardware costs, is unknown. But it proves that money is being generated from the app.

Are there any alternatives?

There are a lot of alternatives, most of which are unstable or shady. However, here are a few alternatives recommended on Reddit. Note that they all come with their own positive and negatives aspects when compared to Popcorn Time.
  • Stremio - Open source project which lets you add your own sources, such as 1337 or Pirate Bay. It also uses official streams from YouTube, HBO and more. Has been reported as unstable but still the best Popcorn alternative.
  • Media Box HD - A MacOS app with 4K streams. Is known to be unstable for some.
  • Leonfix - A Popcorn Time Windows app which doesn't use torrents. Currently in beta.
  • ShowBox - Android alternative which doesn't use torrents. Unstable and currently in beta.
  • Radarr - Which automatically downloads shows and films.

Summary

Despite the concerns about whether or not using Popcorn Time is illegal, there is no denying that the tool is very impressive. The ability to download and stream torrent content in a seamless and hassle-free way is quite brilliant. Not to mention the platform has a much larger library of content with no restrictions whatsoever. So, it’s not surprising why many consider it a better alternative to regular torrents or a Disney+ subscription.

Feedback and corrections are more than welcome! Originally written for Where You Watch.
submitted by TheShynola to PopCornTime [link] [comments]

Ledger Live adds Coin control: Here's why that matters.

Ledger Live adds Coin control: Here's why that matters.
Ledger Live version 2.11.1 (download link) adds Coin control for power users.
The coin control feature gives advanced users more granular control over their wallets. It enables them to change how and which coins are selected when making transactions. This increases their ability to manage their privacy and the network fees they will have to pay to spend their account balance.
More control over your coins

How does it work?

The account balance for Bitcoin and its derivatives consists of all the unspent transaction outputs (UTXOs) in the account. You can think of UTXOs as the coins in a regular wallet. When you receive money, you collect coins in your wallet. Then, when you want to make a payment, you get to choose which coins you pick from your wallet. Do you pick the largest coins first? Or do you want to spend all the smaller value coins to lighten up your wallet? Similar considerations can be made when creating a Bitcoin or Bitcoin derivative (altcoin) transaction.
Before the Coin Control feature was released, all transactions involving Bitcoin (and altcoins) automatically selected their coins using the First-In-First-Out (FIFO) algorithm. This strategy includes the oldest coin in the account, and when the amount is not sufficient the second-oldest coin is added, and so forth.
As of Ledger Live version 2.11.1, users are able to make use of a dedicated Coin Control tool to choose the coin selection strategy and the coins that may be spent.

Using Coin control in Ledger Live

Coin control is available in Advanced options in the Send flow
  1. Click on Send, choose an account to debit, and enter a recipient address. Click on Continue.
  2. Enter an amount and click on Advanced options. You will then see: - The currently selected, default coin selection strategy: Oldest coins first (FIFO). - A toggle to enable Replace-By-Fee (RBF). - A toggle to include coins from unconfirmed, replaceable transactions.
  3. Click on Coin control. The coin control modal opens.
  4. Select a Coin selection strategy from the dropdown menu: - Oldest coins first (FIFO). This is the default strategy that spends the oldest coins first. - Minimize fees (optimize size). This strategy tries to minimize the byte size of the transaction by spending the lowest number of UTXOs. This results in a low network fee. - Minimize future fees (merge coins), This strategy includes the maximum number of inputs so that a potential future price rise does not make smaller UTXOs economically unspendable. If the price of a crypto asset increases too much, small UTXOs may become worth less than the cost of the network fees to spend them.
  5. Select which coins may not be included in the selection by unticking their checkbox. The SELECTED indicator shows which coins will be included in the transaction. By changing the selection strategy and/or coins to include, the user has precise control over which coins end up being spent. The Coins to spend and Change to return indicators show how much is spent from and returned to the account.
  6. Click on Done to return to the Send flow to verify and send the transaction.
The coin control window lets you select the strategy as well as pick the coins. Coins marked SELECTED will be included in the transaction.

Coin status

The following statuses can be displayed for a coin:
  • Coins received in a transaction with 0 confirmations without RBF enabled: PENDING
  • Coins received in a transaction with 0 confirmations with RBF enabled: REPLACEABLE
  • Coins received in a transaction with 1337 confirmations: 1337 CONFIRMATIONS
By enabling the toggle Include coins from unconfirmed, replaceable transactions, replaceable transactions can be selected in the Coin control screen.

The Privacy use case

One of the main use cases for Coin control is to protect one’s privacy. UTXOs are, unfortunately, not perfectly fungible due to their unique history on the blockchain. Therefore, users may want to spend coins from different sources without mixing them together, because this would indicate to an outside observer of the blockchain that these addresses belong to the same account. For instance, if one were to spend coins bought on a KYC exchange, which are associated with the user’s identity, together with coins bought anonymously using cash, the anonymous coins could be linked to the user’s identity.
Another example would be that you would like to prevent spending a high-value coin for smaller purchases because this would unnecessarily show the person you’re paying how much you have. This is similar to not showing the boulanger how much is on your bank account when buying a baguette.

Let us know what you think!

We are excited to release this new feature because we think it will fulfill real needs of an important part of our users. This version of Ledger Live marks an important milestone, but we will continue working on more features that our community wants.
So, we invite you to try out Coin control in Ledger Live and let us know what you think! All feedback is welcome on this thread, on ledgerwallet, and you can send suggestions or get help through our official contact form.
We'd like to close out by underlining our commitment to the Bitcoin community, and our willingness to build the best wallet ecosystem for newbies as well as for power users.
submitted by fabnormal to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

READ THIS NOW: My life of SHOULD'VE, WOULD'VE, COULD'VE until I discovered Crypto.

Mostly all here are invested into Crypto. We all have our own reasons, methods, values of how we invest our money. One thing in common is we all have one main goal. That is to get as much money as possible out of this with the time, and money we can spare.

That's the dam truth##.

We are all here together, and since we are all here on our own will , I want to tell you why you should be proud to hold all your crypto.
I'm 40 years old. At 18 after I graduated HS I had about $7800. $1400 from my graduation party, and $6400 selling my MTG collection on EBay. I also managed a small arcade for about $350 a week.
Back to my MTG collection...
I sold it because it changed. The designs on the new series looked too modern. The original designs were a work of art.
Anyway, I seriously wanted to hold those magic cards but I kept telling myself...
"I can get them back if I want. The price isn't going to move anytime soon. The market is in slight decline. Some of these have been the same price for 2 years now."
I was right, the price of my two Lotus's stayed the same for 5 more years. Not budging . 12 years later after that , those same two cards value at over $60,000ea I believe. If I held untill a few years ago or now, I would've been able to do a quick sale at $400,000. Yes at a discount.
The same goes for all the first edition garbage pail kids I had.

So, what did I do with all $7800##?

I told myself I want to invest it into Microsoft. But I talked myself out of it by saying
"Some people told me the market was a risk, and I had to prepare myself to lose it all"
So I didn't do it. I was close, but I didn't. I could've had OVER A MILLION!
I instead used that money for a school. Business computer programming. It was a waste because 90% of what they taught me came natural. I was doing basic programming at 13 for fun.
I regret not going with my initial FOMO on Microsoft , I regret listening to my own FUD with the MTG cards.
7 years later, I repeated the same mistake...
I had about $15,000 in the bank. I wanted to invest $10,000 in apple after I read about the release of the iphone. Instead opted to do 5k over FUD I read. It was FUD about the risk since they never made phones, and alot of people were ridiculing their idea.
Then I said to myself...
"Fuck that, I don't want to do this. I could do so much more with this 5k"
I instead used the 15k turbocharge my transam, add a racing transmission, tires, rims, new stero system, and I took a 2 week vacation ...GONE!
I got what I wanted. Got laid a bunch of times, went to car shows. That could of been $500k by now.
To top this off, I missed out on a quick $78,000 win at the racetrack because if my own FUD. Horses.
I lost $200, and was left with only I $5 that night. I decided, "you know what, fuck it, I'm going to do a completely off the wall wild bet.
I did a completely wild bet for $5. I picked all longshots in what they call a "Superfecta"(4 horses in that exact order 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th place prediction.
1 minute before the race started, I Cancelled the bet. I told myself ...
"this is stupid, 99:1, 78:1, 56:1, 38:1 long shots coming out in this order? THATS INSANE...Why am I blowing 5 away? Fuck that, I instead put $5 on the 10:1 to win hopefully my to maybe get $50 back "
Well. Guess what? The 3nd largest superfecta payout in history. No body won it! It came out in the original order I out it in that's to a series of freak disqualifications in the race.
I hate myself for cancelling that. But hey, maybe that happened for a reason. Maybe I wouldn't have ended up living on another country for 2 years. Learning another language.
You see
So many times in my life I had the perfect opportunity, and I didn't take it. I let Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt make my Choices for me.
Then came crypto currency. In late 2016, a client of mine told me he got rich off Bitcoin. He raved about it . He told me about ripple, ETH etc.
I invested in his recommendation about XRP when it was $0.005. it FLEW UP from there. I took some of that massive gain and bought other things, and those FLEW. For someone like me, it was LOTS of money off my original $500.
Sure this was a "lucky time" to get in but that's not the point I'm trying to make here. The point is that I finally did it! I didn't let FUD fuck with my head. I just did it. I cashed out already in late 2017. About 90% of what I gained. Payed off all my debt, and my truck, and had another $30k or so to put a down payment on a house. If I didn't just stick with my guns and let the FUD get to me, then I would still be in a whole bunch of debt. Especially with this whole lockdown bullshit. But now....
NOW ,I never again I will tell myself...
"IF ONLY I DID THAT WHEN I HAD THE CHANCE"
NOW I NEVER HAVE TO SAY THAT AGAIN! I DONT GIVE A SHIT IF IT TANKS ANOTHER 50% FROM HERE because it's all house money. I NOW NEVER HAVE TO SAY ...
"IF ONLY I DID IT"
NOW I DID!
Crypto Currency is severely undervalued. Its manipulated down right now. This about this logic, how can something increasingly popular with more and more support by the day drop in price? Crypto isn't human. Bitcoin isnt getting fired over sexual harrassement, there isn't a corporate takeover. Its manipulation.
I don't care if this shit takes 5 years to recover. I'm holding . I don't care if BTC dips to $1000. I'm holding till this MCAP tops 10 trillion. so if you love your crypto, hold that F#%KING SHIT!
The lesson here is never let FUD make choices for you. Stick to your original beliefs. If there's a voice in the back of your head telling you "I want to do this", then Listen to that voice. That's you! Listen to yourself, not the new voice that intrudes after your choice.
submitted by JuicySpark to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

Technical: Confidential Transactions and Their Implementation Tradeoffs

As requested by estradata here: https://old.reddit.com/Bitcoin/comments/iylou9/what_are_some_of_the_latest_innovations_in_the/g6heez1/
It is a general issue that crops up at the extremes of cryptography, with quantum breaks being just one of the extremes of (classical) cryptography.

Computational vs Information-Theoretic

The dichotomy is between computationally infeasible vs informationally-theoretic infeasible. Basically:
Quantum breaks represent a possible reduction in computational infeasibility of certain things, but not information-theoretic infeasibility.
For example, suppose you want to know what 256-bit preimages map to 256-bit hashes. In theory, you just need to build a table with 2256 entries and start from 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 and so on. This is computationally infeasible, but not information-theoretic infeasible.
However, suppose you want to know what preimages, of any size, map to 256-bit hashes. Since the preimages can be of any size, after finishing with 256-bit preimages, you have to proceed to 257-bit preimages. And so on. And there is no size limit, so you will literally never finish. Even if you lived forever, you would not complete it. This is information-theoretic infeasible.

Commitments

How does this relate to confidential transactions? Basically, every confidential transaction simply hides the value behind a homomorphic commitment. What is a homomorphic commitment? Okay, let's start with commitments. A commitment is something which lets you hide something, and later reveal what you hid. Until you reveal it, even if somebody has access to the commitment, they cannot reverse it to find out what you hid. This is called the "hiding property" of commitments. However, when you do reveal it (or "open the commitment"), then you cannot replace what you hid with some other thing. This is called the "binding property" of commitments.
For example, a hash of a preimage is a commitment. Suppose I want to commit to something. For example, I want to show that I can predict the future using the energy of a spare galaxy I have in my pocket. I can hide that something by hashing a description of the future. Then I can give the hash to you. You still cannot learn the future, because it's just a hash, and you can't reverse the hash ("hiding"). But suppose the future event occurs. I can reveal that I did, in fact, know the future. So I give you the description, and you hash it and compare it to the hash I gave earlier. Because of preimage resistance, I cannot retroactively change what I hid in the hash, so what I gave must have been known to me at the time that I gave you the commitment i..e. hash ("binding").

Homomorphic Commitments

A homomorphic commitment simply means that if I can do certain operations on preimages of the commitment scheme, there are certain operations on the commitments that would create similar ("homo") changes ("morphic") to the commitments. For example, suppose I have a magical function h() which is a homomorphic commitment scheme. It can hide very large (near 256-bit) numbers. Then if h() is homomorphic, there may be certain operations on numbers behind the h() that have homomorphisms after the h(). For example, I might have an operation <+> that is homomorphic in h() on +, or in other words, if I have two large numbers a and b, then h(a + b) = h(a) <+> h(b). + and <+> are different operations, but they are homomorphic to each other.
For example, elliptic curve scalars and points have homomorphic operations. Scalars (private keys) are "just" very large near-256-bit numbers, while points are a scalar times a standard generator point G. Elliptic curve operations exist where there is a <+> between points that is homomorphic on standard + on scalars, and a <*> between a scalar and a point that is homomorphic on standard * multiplication on scalars.
For example, suppose I have two large scalars a and b. I can use elliptic curve points as a commitment scheme: I can take a <*> G to generate a point A. It is hiding since nobody can learn what a is unless I reveal it (a and A can be used in standard ECDSA private-public key cryptography, with the scalar a as the private key and the point A as the public key, and the a cannot be derived even if somebody else knows A). Thus, it is hiding. At the same time, for a particular point A and standard generator point G, there is only one possible scalar a which when "multiplied" with G yields A. So scalars and elliptic curve points are a commitment scheme, with both hiding and binding properties.
Now, as mentioned there is a <+> operation on points that is homomorphic to the + operation on corresponding scalars. For example, suppose there are two scalars a and b. I can compute (a + b) <*> G to generate a particular point. But even if I don't know scalars a and b, but I do know points A = a <*> G and B = b <*> G, then I can use A <+> B to derive (a + b) <*> G (or equivalently, (a <*> G) <+> (b <*> G) == (a + b) <*> G). This makes points a homomorphic commitment scheme on scalars.

Confidential Transactions: A Sketch

This is useful since we can easily use the near-256-bit scalars in SECP256K1 elliptic curves to easily represent values in a monetary system, and hide those values by using a homomorphic commitment scheme. We can use the hiding property to prevent people from learning the values of the money we are sending and receiving.
Now, in a proper cryptocurrency, a normal, non-coinbase transaction does not create or destroy coins: the values of the input coins are equal to the value of the output coins. We can use a homomorphic commitment scheme. Suppose I have a transaction that consumes an input value a and creates two output values b and c. That is, a = b + c, i.e. the sum of all inputs a equals the sum of all outputs b and c. But remember, with a homomorphic commitment scheme like elliptic curve points, there exists a <+> operation on points that is homomorphic to the ordinary school-arithmetic + addition on large numbers. So, confidential transactions can use points a <*> G as input, and points b <*> G and c <*> G as output, and we can easily prove that a <*> G = (b <*> G) <+> (c <*> G) if a = b + c, without revealing a, b, or c to anyone.

Pedersen Commitments

Actually, we cannot just use a <*> G as a commitment scheme in practice. Remember, Bitcoin has a cap on the number of satoshis ever to be created, and it's less than 253 satoshis, which is fairly trivial. I can easily compute all values of a <*> G for all values of a from 0 to 253 and know which a <*> G corresponds to which actual amount a. So in confidential transactions, we cannot naively use a <*> G commitments, we need Pedersen commitments.
If you know what a "salt" is, then Pedersen commitments are fairly obvious. A "salt" is something you add to e.g. a password so that the hash of the password is much harder to attack. Humans are idiots and when asked to generate passwords, will output a password that takes less than 230 possibilities, which is fairly easy to grind. So what you do is that you "salt" a password by prepending a random string to it. You then hash the random string + password, and store the random string --- the salt --- together with the hash in your database. Then when somebody logs in, you take the password, prepend the salt, hash, and check if the hash matches with the in-database hash, and you let them log in. Now, with a hash, even if somebody copies your password database, the can't get the password. They're hashed. But with a salt, even techniques like rainbow tables make a hacker's life even harder. They can't hash a possible password and check every hash in your db for something that matches. Instead, if they get a possible password, they have to prepend each salt, hash, then compare. That greatly increases the computational needs of a hacker, which is why salts are good.
What a Pedersen commitment is, is a point a <*> H, where a is the actual value you commit to, plus <+> another point r <*> G. H here is a second standard generator point, different from G. The r is the salt in the Pedersen commitment. It makes it so that even if you show (a <*> H) <+> (r <*> G) to somebody, they can't grind all possible values of a and try to match it with your point --- they also have to grind r (just as with the password-salt example above). And r is much larger, it can be a true near-256-bit number that is the range of scalars in SECP256K1, whereas a is constrained to "reasonable" numbers of satoshi, which cannot exceed 21 million Bitcoins.
Now, in order to validate a transaction with input a and outputs b and c, you only have to prove a = b + c. Suppose we are hiding those amounts using Pedersen commitments. You have an input of amount a, and you know a and r. The blockchain has an amount (a <*> H) <+> (r <*> G). In order to create the two outputs b and c, you just have to create two new r scalars such that r = r[0] + r[1]. This is trivial, you just select a new random r[0] and then compute r[1] = r - r[0], it's just basic algebra.
Then you create a transaction consuming the input (a <*> H) <+> (r <*> G) and outputs (b <*> H) <+> (r[0] <*> G) and (c <*> H) <+> (r[1] <*> G). You know that a = b + c, and r = r[0] + r[1], while fullnodes around the world, who don't know any of the amounts or scalars involved, can just take the points (a <*> H) <+> (r <*> G) and see if it equals (b <*> H) <+> (r[0] <*> G) <+> (c <*> H) <+> (r[1] <*> G). That is all that fullnodes have to validate, they just need to perform <+> operations on points and comparison on points, and from there they validate transactions, all without knowing the actual values involved.

Computational Binding, Information-Theoretic Hiding

Like all commitments, Pedersen Commitments are binding and hiding.
However, there are really two kinds of commitments:
What does this mean? It's just a measure of how "impossible" binding vs hiding is. Pedersen commitments are computationally binding, meaning that in theory, a user of this commitment with arbitrary time and space and energy can, in theory, replace the amount with something else. However, it is information-theoretic hiding, meaning an attacker with arbitrary time and space and energy cannot figure out exactly what got hidden behind the commitment.
But why?
Now, we have been using a and a <*> G as private keys and public keys in ECDSA and Schnorr. There is an operation <*> on a scalar and a point that generates another point, but we cannot "revrese" this operation. For example, even if I know A, and know that A = a <*> G, but do not know a, I cannot derive a --- there is no operation between A G that lets me know a.
Actually there is: I "just" need to have so much time, space, and energy that I just start counting a from 0 to 2256 and find which a results in A = a <*> G. This is a computational limit: I don't have a spare universe in my back pocket I can use to do all those computations.
Now, replace a with h and A with H. Remember that Pedersen commitments use a "second" standard generator point. The generator points G and H are "not really special" --- they are just random points on the curve that we selected and standardized. There is no operation H G such that I can learn h where H = h <*> G, though if I happen to have a spare universe in my back pocket I can "just" brute force it.
Suppose I do have a spare universe in my back pocket, and learn h = H G such that H = h <*> G. What can I do in Pedersen commitments?
Well, I have an amount a that is committed to by (a <*> H) <+> (r <*> G). But I happen to know h! Suppose I want to double my money a without involving Elon Musk. Then:
That is what we mean by computationally binding: if I can compute h such that H = h <*> G, then I can find another number which opens the same commitment. And of course I'd make sure that number is much larger than what I originally had in that address!
Now, the reason why it is "only" computationally binding is that it is information-theoretically hiding. Suppose somebody knows h, but has no money in the cryptocurrency. All they see are points. They can try to find what the original amounts are, but because any amount can be mapped to "the same" point with knowledge of h (e.g. in the above, a and 2 * a got mapped to the same point by "just" replacing the salt r with r - a * h; this can be done for 3 * a, 4 * a etc.), they cannot learn historical amounts --- the a in historical amounts could be anything.
The drawback, though, is that --- as seen above --- arbitrary inflation is now introduced once somebody knows h. They can multiply their money by any arbitrary factor with knowledge of h.
It is impossible to have both perfect hiding (i.e. historical amounts remain hidden even after a computational break) and perfect binding (i.e. you can't later open the commitment to a different, much larger, amount).
Pedersen commitments just happen to have perfect hiding, but only computationally-infeasible binding. This means they allow hiding historical values, but in case of anything that allows better computational power --- including but not limited to quantum breaks --- they allow arbitrary inflation.

Changing The Tradeoffs with ElGamal Commitments

An ElGamal commitment is just a Pedersen commitment, but with the point r <*> G also stored in a separate section of the transaction.
This commits the r, and fixes it to a specific value. This prevents me from opening my (a <*> H) <+> (r <*> G) as ((2 * a) <*> H) <+> ((r - a * h) <*> G), because the (r - a * h) would not match the r <*> G sitting in a separate section of the transaction. This forces me to be bound to that specific value, and no amount of computation power will let me escape --- it is information-theoretically binding i.e. perfectly binding.
But that is now computationally hiding. An evil surveillor with arbitrary time and space can focus on the r <*> G sitting in a separate section of the transaction, and grind r from 0 to 2256 to determine what r matches that point. Then from there, they can negate r to get (-r) <*> G and add it to the (a <*> H) <+> (r <*> G) to get a <*> H, and then grind that to determine the value a. With massive increases in computational ability --- including but not limited to quantum breaks --- an evil surveillor can see all the historical amounts of confidential transactions.

Conclusion

This is the source of the tradeoff: either you design confidential transactions so in case of a quantum break, historical transactions continue to hide their amounts, but inflation of the money is now unavoidable, OR you make the money supply sacrosanct, but you potentially sacrifice amount hiding in case of some break, including but not limited to quantum breaks.
submitted by almkglor to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

The three things that keep me up at night.

Tonight I read this article and while it doesn’t get too deep into the technical weeds, I thought I could do better by breaking down some of the IT threats and concerns that keep me up at night into more of a non-tech person’s language while giving real world examples why this stuff really does matter to everyone, not just the uber nerds, naysayers, and tinfoil hat wearing conspiracy theorists.
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/09/18/a-real-life-maze-ransomware-attack-if-at-first-you-dont-succeed/
Security (both digital and physical) is something most people don’t understand and as a result they act like an ostrich by burying their head in the sand; if I can’t see it, it can’t see me. Until recently I was an IT consultant and would frequently bring this up to my clients. The usual reply I hear is along the lines of “but my company doesn’t have much money, isn’t a bank, doesn’t do anything interesting, etc. so they aren’t going to target me and I don’t have anything to worry about.” Sadly, this isn’t the case. These crooks “spray and pray” and will victimize anyone who gets caught in their snare. They will send out hundreds of millions of emails, compromise thousands of websites, and make tens of thousands of robocalls all with the expectation that they are only going to be able to victimize 0.0001% of their attempts.
For years there have been two big threats in the IT world that literally keep me up at night; regulatory compliance and ransomware. There is now a third, extortionware.
Regulatory compliance is an area business owners and executives commonly overlook because they don’t think it applies to their company because they’re not in health care or banking. PCI (Payment Card Industry), PII (Personal Identifiable Information), HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act), and HITECH (Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act) are the most common compliance standards and now cover just about every company in existence in the United States. If the company takes credit cards of any kind there are some levels of PCI compliance that they need to be adhered with. PII covers most HR information like social security numbers or driver license numbers. HIPAA and HITECH both cover information related to health records. This is one that most companies overlook because they don’t realize things like workmen’s compensation claims, HR records that discuss health related issues, etc. are all covered by these standards. Fines from the governing bodies that cover their respective compliance standards are usually preventable because they have general guidelines that cover what needs to be done to be in compliance on the logistical, physical, and digital fronts. If your company does anything with the European Union, then GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) is a new regulation that has some pretty serious consequences if not followed properly.
Ransomware is a genre of computer virus that is just evil. It encrypts your data and give you a very short period of time (typically only a couple days) to pay the ransom using untraceable funds transfers via cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. If you don’t pay the ransom in time they will delete the decryption key thus destroying all your data. If you do pay the ransom then chances are you will get your data back however you are likely very literally funding terrorism and/or some other kind of organized crime. These ransoms are also meant to be payable but be painful to pay. The newer ransomware variants will scan your network to get an idea of how big it is then adjust the ransom accordingly; the more devices, the higher the ransom. Typical ransoms start around a few thousand dollars and work their way up hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars. If you’re infected with these viruses then the best course of action to remove it is to wipe your entire network (all servers, workstations, firewall and switch configs, etc.) and rebuild it from scratch while restoring your important data from backups into a separate clean environment, scanning it for any traces of the virus, then moving it into the newly rebuilt network. While this is typically more expensive than paying the ransom it is the only way you can be sure the virus is no longer on your network and thus capable of infecting everything all over again and repeating the ransom process.
Extortionware is similar to its older sibling ransomware in that the virus typically does all the same things however it adds an even more sinister twist, it copies your data offsite to a server only the criminals can access. They do this because of the increased number of companies that have opted to not pay the ransom and just rebuild their network. Using extortionware the criminals now have the company’s intellectual property (usually proprietary), HR data, internal memos, financial data, emails, etc.. Did someone say something unflattering about someone else in an email, did HR have a spreadsheet with every employee’s SSNs, hire dates, etc., or are there private financial records relating to an upcoming acquisition that your competitors shouldn’t know about? All of this and more will be used by the criminals to extort money from the company. This means that even if you have a rock solid backup of all your data, you still need to pay to prevent your data from being released to the public and/or press.
While this post just scratches the surface, it does cover the highlights on why I push for stronger passwords (longer is better than higher complexity https://xkpasswd.net), keeping non-company owned and unmanaged devices off internal networks, multiple factor authentication on everything, never sharing your passwords with anyone, running regular security related exercises, using unique passwords on everything, and using a reputable password manager to keep track of all your passwords.
submitted by tigerguppy126 to sysadmin [link] [comments]

Taproot, CoinJoins, and Cross-Input Signature Aggregation

It is a very common misconception that the upcoming Taproot upgrade helps CoinJoin.
TLDR: The upcoming Taproot upgrade does not help equal-valued CoinJoin at all, though it potentially increases the privacy of other protocols, such as the Lightning Network, and escrow contract schemes.
If you want to learn more, read on!

Equal-valued CoinJoins

Let's start with equal-valued CoinJoins, the type JoinMarket and Wasabi use. What happens is that some number of participants agree on some common value all of them use. With JoinMarket the taker defines this value and pays the makers to agree to it, with Wasabi the server defines a value approximately 0.1 BTC.
Then, each participant provides inputs that they unilaterally control, totaling equal or greater than the common value. Typically since each input is unilaterally controlled, each input just requires a singlesig. Each participant also provides up to two addresses they control: one of these will be paid with the common value, while the other will be used for any extra value in the inputs they provided (i.e. the change output).
The participants then make a single transaction that spends all the provided inputs and pays out to the appropriate outputs. The inputs and outputs are shuffled in some secure manner. Then the unsigned transaction is distributed back to all participants.
Finally, each participant checks that the transaction spends the inputs it provided (and more importantly does not spend any other coins it might own that it did not provide for this CoinJoin!) and that the transaction pays out to the appropriate address(es) it controls. Once they have validated the transaction, they ratify it by signing for each of the inputs it provided.
Once every participant has provided signatures for all inputs it registered, the transaction is now completely signed and the CoinJoin transaction is now validly confirmable.
CoinJoin is a very simple and direct privacy boost, it requires no SCRIPTs, needs only singlesig, etc.

Privacy

Let's say we have two participants who have agreed on a common amount of 0.1 BTC. One provides a 0.105 coin as input, the other provides a 0.114 coin as input. This results in a CoinJoin with a 0.105 coin and a 0.114 coin as input, and outputs with 0.1, 0.005, 0.014, and 0.1 BTC.
Now obviously the 0.005 output came from the 0.105 input, and the 0.014 output came from the 0.114 input.
But the two 0.1 BTC outputs cannot be correlated with either input! There is no correlating information, since either output could have come from either input. That is how common CoinJoin implementations like Wasabi and JoinMarket gain privacy.

Banning CoinJoins

Unfortunately, large-scale CoinJoins like that made by Wasabi and JoinMarket are very obvious.
All you have to do is look for a transactions where, say, more than 3 outputs are the same equal value, and the number of inputs is equal or larger than the number of equal-valued outputs. Thus, it is trivial to identify equal-valued CoinJoins made by Wasabi and JoinMarket. You can even trivially differentiate them: Wasabi equal-valued CoinJoins are going to have a hundred or more inputs, with outputs that are in units of approximately 0.1 BTC, while JoinMarket CoinJoins have equal-valued outputs of less than a dozen (between 4 to 6 usually) and with the common value varying wildly from as low as 0.001 BTC to as high as a dozen BTC or more.
This has led to a number of anti-privacy exchanges to refuse to credit custodially-held accounts if the incoming deposit is within a few hops of an equal-valued CoinJoin, usually citing concerns about regulations. Crucially, the exchange continues to hold private keys for those "banned" deposits, and can still spend them, thus this is effectively a theft. If your exchange does this to you, you should report that exchange as stealing money from its customers. Not your keys not your coins.
Thus, CoinJoins represent a privacy tradeoff:

Taproot

Let's now briefly discuss that nice new shiny thing called Taproot.
Taproot includes two components:
This has some nice properties:

Taproot DOES NOT HELP CoinJoin

So let's review!
CoinJoin:
Taproot:
There is absolutely no overlap. Taproot helps things that CoinJoin does not use. CoinJoin uses things that Taproot does not improve.

B-but They Said!!

A lot of early reporting on Taproot claimed that Taproot benefits CoinJoin.
What they are confusing is that earlier drafts of Taproot included a feature called cross-input signature aggregation.
In current Bitcoin, every input, to be spent, has to be signed individually. With cross-input signature aggregation, all inputs that support this feature are signed with a single signature that covers all those inputs. So for example if you would spend two inputs, current Bitcoin requires a signature for each input, but with cross-input signature aggregation you can sign both of them with a single signature. This works even if the inputs have different public keys: two inputs with cross-input signature aggregation effectively define a 2-of-2 public key, and you can only sign for that input if you know the private keys for both inputs, or if you are cooperatively signing with somebody who knows the private key of the other input.
This helps CoinJoin costs. Since CoinJoins will have lots of inputs (each participant will provide at least one, and probably will provide more, and larger participant sets are better for more privacy in CoinJoin), if all of them enabled cross-input signature aggregation, such large CoinJoins can have only a single signature.
This complicates the signing process for CoinJoins (the signers now have to sign cooperatively) but it can be well worth it for the reduced signature size and onchain cost.
But note that the while cross-input signature aggregation improves the cost of CoinJoins, it does not improve the privacy! Equal-valued CoinJoins are still obvious and still readily bannable by privacy-hating exchanges. It does not improve the privacy of CoinJoin. Instead, see https://old.reddit.com/Bitcoin/comments/gqb3udesign_for_a_coinswap_implementation_fo

Why isn't cross-input signature aggregation in?

There's some fairly complex technical reasons why cross-input signature aggregation isn't in right now in the current Taproot proposal.
The primary reason was to reduce the technical complexity of Taproot, in the hope that it would be easier to convince users to activate (while support for Taproot is quite high, developers have become wary of being hopeful that new proposals will ever activate, given the previous difficulties with SegWit).
The main technical complexity here is that it interacts with future ways to extend Bitcoin.
The rest of this writeup assumes you already know about how Bitcoin SCRIPT works. If you don't understand how Bitcoin SCRIPT works at the low-level, then the TLDR is that cross-input signature aggregation complicates how to extend Bitcoin in the future, so it was deferred to let the develoeprs think more about it.
(this is how I understand it; perhaps pwuille or ajtowns can give a better summary.)
In detail, Taproot also introduces OP_SUCCESS opcodes. If you know about the OP_NOP opcodes already defined in current Bitcoin, well, OP_SUCCESS is basically "OP_NOP done right".
Now, OP_NOP is a do-nothing operation. It can be replaced in future versions of Bitcoin by having that operation check some condition, and then fail if the condition is not satisfied. For example, both OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY and OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY were previously OP_NOP opcodes. Older nodes will see an OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY and think it does nothing, but newer nodes will check if the nLockTime field has a correct specified value, and fail if the condition is not satisfied. Since most of the nodes on the network are using much newer versions of the node software, older nodes are protected from miners who try to misspend any OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY/OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY, and those older nodes will still remain capable of synching with the rest of the network: a dedication to strict backward-compatibility necessary for a consensus system.
Softforks basically mean that a script that passes in the latest version must also be passing in all older versions. A script cannot be passing in newer versions but failing in older versions, because that would kick older nodes off the network (i.e. it would be a hardfork).
But OP_NOP is a very restricted way of adding opcodes. Opcodes that replace OP_NOP can only do one thing: check if some condition is true. They can't push new data on the stack, they can't pop items off the stack. For example, suppose instead of OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY, we had added a OP_GETBLOCKHEIGHT opcode. This opcode would push the height of the blockchain on the stack. If this command replaced an older OP_NOP opcode, then a script like OP_GETBLOCKHEIGHT 650000 OP_EQUAL might pass in some future Bitcoin version, but older versions would see OP_NOP 650000 OP_EQUAL, which would fail because OP_EQUAL expects two items on the stack. So older versions will fail a SCRIPT that newer versions will pass, which is a hardfork and thus a backwards incompatibility.
OP_SUCCESS is different. Instead, old nodes, when parsing the SCRIPT, will see OP_SUCCESS, and, without executing the body, will consider the SCRIPT as passing. So, the OP_GETBLOCKHEIGHT 650000 OP_EQUAL example will now work: a future version of Bitcoin might pass it, and existing nodes that don't understand OP_GETBLOCKHEIGHT will se OP_SUCCESS 650000 OP_EQUAL, and will not execute the SCRIPT at all, instead passing it immediately. So a SCRIPT that might pass in newer versions will pass for older versions, which keeps the back-compatibility consensus that a softfork needs.
So how does OP_SUCCESS make things difficult for cross-input signatur aggregation? Well, one of the ways to ask for a signature to be verified is via the opcodes OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY. With cross-input signature aggregation, if a public key indicates it can be used for cross-input signature aggregation, instead of OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY actually requiring the signature on the stack, the stack will contain a dummy 0 value for the signature, and the public key is instead added to a "sum" public key (i.e. an n-of-n that is dynamically extended by one more pubkey for each OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY operation that executes) for the single signature that is verified later by the cross-input signature aggregation validation algorithm00.
The important part here is that the OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY has to execute, in order to add its public key to the set of public keys to be checked in the single signature.
But remember that an OP_SUCCESS prevents execution! As soon as the SCRIPT is parsed, if any opcode is OP_SUCCESS, that is considered as passing, without actually executing the SCRIPT, because the OP_SUCCESS could mean something completely different in newer versions and current versions should assume nothing about what it means. If the SCRIPT contains some OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY command in addition to an OP_SUCCESS, that command is not executed by current versions, and thus they cannot add any public keys given by OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY. Future versions also have to accept that: if they parsed an OP_SUCCESS command that has a new meaning in the future, and then execute an OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY in that SCRIPT, they cannot add the public key into the same "sum" public key that older nodes use, because older nodes cannot see them. This means that you might need more than one signature in the future, in the presence of an opcode that replaces some OP_SUCCESS.
Thus, because of the complexity of making cross-input signature aggregation work compatibly with future extensions to the protocol, cross-input signature aggregation was deferred.
submitted by almkglor to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Technical: Taproot: Why Activate?

This is a follow-up on https://old.reddit.com/Bitcoin/comments/hqzp14/technical_the_path_to_taproot_activation/
Taproot! Everybody wants it!! But... you might ask yourself: sure, everybody else wants it, but why would I, sovereign Bitcoin HODLer, want it? Surely I can be better than everybody else because I swapped XXX fiat for Bitcoin unlike all those nocoiners?
And it is important for you to know the reasons why you, o sovereign Bitcoiner, would want Taproot activated. After all, your nodes (or the nodes your wallets use, which if you are SPV, you hopefully can pester to your wallet vendoimplementor about) need to be upgraded in order for Taproot activation to actually succeed instead of becoming a hot sticky mess.
First, let's consider some principles of Bitcoin.
I'm sure most of us here would agree that the above are very important principles of Bitcoin and that these are principles we would not be willing to remove. If anything, we would want those principles strengthened (especially the last one, financial privacy, which current Bitcoin is only sporadically strong with: you can get privacy, it just requires effort to do so).
So, how does Taproot affect those principles?

Taproot and Your /Coins

Most HODLers probably HODL their coins in singlesig addresses. Sadly, switching to Taproot would do very little for you (it gives a mild discount at spend time, at the cost of a mild increase in fee at receive time (paid by whoever sends to you, so if it's a self-send from a P2PKH or bech32 address, you pay for this); mostly a wash).
(technical details: a Taproot output is 1 version byte + 32 byte public key, while a P2WPKH (bech32 singlesig) output is 1 version byte + 20 byte public key hash, so the Taproot output spends 12 bytes more; spending from a P2WPKH requires revealing a 32-byte public key later, which is not needed with Taproot, and Taproot signatures are about 9 bytes smaller than P2WPKH signatures, but the 32 bytes plus 9 bytes is divided by 4 because of the witness discount, so it saves about 11 bytes; mostly a wash, it increases blockweight by about 1 virtual byte, 4 weight for each Taproot-output-input, compared to P2WPKH-output-input).
However, as your HODLings grow in value, you might start wondering if multisignature k-of-n setups might be better for the security of your savings. And it is in multisignature that Taproot starts to give benefits!
Taproot switches to using Schnorr signing scheme. Schnorr makes key aggregation -- constructing a single public key from multiple public keys -- almost as trivial as adding numbers together. "Almost" because it involves some fairly advanced math instead of simple boring number adding, but hey when was the last time you added up your grocery list prices by hand huh?
With current P2SH and P2WSH multisignature schemes, if you have a 2-of-3 setup, then to spend, you need to provide two different signatures from two different public keys. With Taproot, you can create, using special moon math, a single public key that represents your 2-of-3 setup. Then you just put two of your devices together, have them communicate to each other (this can be done airgapped, in theory, by sending QR codes: the software to do this is not even being built yet, but that's because Taproot hasn't activated yet!), and they will make a single signature to authorize any spend from your 2-of-3 address. That's 73 witness bytes -- 18.25 virtual bytes -- of signatures you save!
And if you decide that your current setup with 1-of-1 P2PKH / P2WPKH addresses is just fine as-is: well, that's the whole point of a softfork: backwards-compatibility; you can receive from Taproot users just fine, and once your wallet is updated for Taproot-sending support, you can send to Taproot users just fine as well!
(P2WPKH and P2WSH -- SegWit v0 -- addresses start with bc1q; Taproot -- SegWit v1 --- addresses start with bc1p, in case you wanted to know the difference; in bech32 q is 0, p is 1)
Now how about HODLers who keep all, or some, of their coins on custodial services? Well, any custodial service worth its salt would be doing at least 2-of-3, or probably something even bigger, like 11-of-15. So your custodial service, if it switched to using Taproot internally, could save a lot more (imagine an 11-of-15 getting reduced from 11 signatures to just 1!), which --- we can only hope! --- should translate to lower fees and better customer service from your custodial service!
So I think we can say, very accurately, that the Bitcoin principle --- that YOU are in control of your money --- can only be helped by Taproot (if you are doing multisignature), and, because P2PKH and P2WPKH remain validly-usable addresses in a Taproot future, will not be harmed by Taproot. Its benefit to this principle might be small (it mostly only benefits multisignature users) but since it has no drawbacks with this (i.e. singlesig users can continue to use P2WPKH and P2PKH still) this is still a nice, tidy win!
(even singlesig users get a minor benefit, in that multisig users will now reduce their blockchain space footprint, so that fees can be kept low for everybody; so for example even if you have your single set of private keys engraved on titanium plates sealed in an airtight box stored in a safe buried in a desert protected by angry nomads riding giant sandworms because you're the frickin' Kwisatz Haderach, you still gain some benefit from Taproot)
And here's the important part: if P2PKH/P2WPKH is working perfectly fine with you and you decide to never use Taproot yourself, Taproot will not affect you detrimentally. First do no harm!

Taproot and Your Contracts

No one is an island, no one lives alone. Give and you shall receive. You know: by trading with other people, you can gain expertise in some obscure little necessity of the world (and greatly increase your productivity in that little field), and then trade the products of your expertise for necessities other people have created, all of you thereby gaining gains from trade.
So, contracts, which are basically enforceable agreements that facilitate trading with people who you do not personally know and therefore might not trust.
Let's start with a simple example. You want to buy some gewgaws from somebody. But you don't know them personally. The seller wants the money, you want their gewgaws, but because of the lack of trust (you don't know them!! what if they're scammers??) neither of you can benefit from gains from trade.
However, suppose both of you know of some entity that both of you trust. That entity can act as a trusted escrow. The entity provides you security: this enables the trade, allowing both of you to get gains from trade.
In Bitcoin-land, this can be implemented as a 2-of-3 multisignature. The three signatories in the multisgnature would be you, the gewgaw seller, and the escrow. You put the payment for the gewgaws into this 2-of-3 multisignature address.
Now, suppose it turns out neither of you are scammers (whaaaat!). You receive the gewgaws just fine and you're willing to pay up for them. Then you and the gewgaw seller just sign a transaction --- you and the gewgaw seller are 2, sufficient to trigger the 2-of-3 --- that spends from the 2-of-3 address to a singlesig the gewgaw seller wants (or whatever address the gewgaw seller wants).
But suppose some problem arises. The seller gave you gawgews instead of gewgaws. Or you decided to keep the gewgaws but not sign the transaction to release the funds to the seller. In either case, the escrow is notified, and if it can sign with you to refund the funds back to you (if the seller was a scammer) or it can sign with the seller to forward the funds to the seller (if you were a scammer).
Taproot helps with this: like mentioned above, it allows multisignature setups to produce only one signature, reducing blockchain space usage, and thus making contracts --- which require multiple people, by definition, you don't make contracts with yourself --- is made cheaper (which we hope enables more of these setups to happen for more gains from trade for everyone, also, moon and lambos).
(technology-wise, it's easier to make an n-of-n than a k-of-n, making a k-of-n would require a complex setup involving a long ritual with many communication rounds between the n participants, but an n-of-n can be done trivially with some moon math. You can, however, make what is effectively a 2-of-3 by using a three-branch SCRIPT: either 2-of-2 of you and seller, OR 2-of-2 of you and escrow, OR 2-of-2 of escrow and seller. Fortunately, Taproot adds a facility to embed a SCRIPT inside a public key, so you can have a 2-of-2 Taprooted address (between you and seller) with a SCRIPT branch that can instead be spent with 2-of-2 (you + escrow) OR 2-of-2 (seller + escrow), which implements the three-branched SCRIPT above. If neither of you are scammers (hopefully the common case) then you both sign using your keys and never have to contact the escrow, since you are just using the escrow public key without coordinating with them (because n-of-n is trivial but k-of-n requires setup with communication rounds), so in the "best case" where both of you are honest traders, you also get a privacy boost, in that the escrow never learns you have been trading on gewgaws, I mean ewww, gawgews are much better than gewgaws and therefore I now judge you for being a gewgaw enthusiast, you filthy gewgawer).

Taproot and Your Contracts, Part 2: Cryptographic Boogaloo

Now suppose you want to buy some data instead of things. For example, maybe you have some closed-source software in trial mode installed, and want to pay the developer for the full version. You want to pay for an activation code.
This can be done, today, by using an HTLC. The developer tells you the hash of the activation code. You pay to an HTLC, paying out to the developer if it reveals the preimage (the activation code), or refunding the money back to you after a pre-agreed timeout. If the developer claims the funds, it has to reveal the preimage, which is the activation code, and you can now activate your software. If the developer does not claim the funds by the timeout, you get refunded.
And you can do that, with HTLCs, today.
Of course, HTLCs do have problems:
Fortunately, with Schnorr (which is enabled by Taproot), we can now use the Scriptless Script constuction by Andrew Poelstra. This Scriptless Script allows a new construction, the PTLC or Pointlocked Timelocked Contract. Instead of hashes and preimages, just replace "hash" with "point" and "preimage" with "scalar".
Or as you might know them: "point" is really "public key" and "scalar" is really a "private key". What a PTLC does is that, given a particular public key, the pointlocked branch can be spent only if the spender reveals the private key of the given public key to you.
Another nice thing with PTLCs is that they are deniable. What appears onchain is just a single 2-of-2 signature between you and the developemanufacturer. It's like a magic trick. This signature has no special watermarks, it's a perfectly normal signature (the pledge). However, from this signature, plus some datta given to you by the developemanufacturer (known as the adaptor signature) you can derive the private key of a particular public key you both agree on (the turn). Anyone scraping the blockchain will just see signatures that look just like every other signature, and as long as nobody manages to hack you and get a copy of the adaptor signature or the private key, they cannot get the private key behind the public key (point) that the pointlocked branch needs (the prestige).
(Just to be clear, the public key you are getting the private key from, is distinct from the public key that the developemanufacturer will use for its funds. The activation key is different from the developer's onchain Bitcoin key, and it is the activation key whose private key you will be learning, not the developer's/manufacturer's onchain Bitcoin key).
So:
Taproot lets PTLCs exist onchain because they enable Schnorr, which is a requirement of PTLCs / Scriptless Script.
(technology-wise, take note that Scriptless Script works only for the "pointlocked" branch of the contract; you need normal Script, or a pre-signed nLockTimed transaction, for the "timelocked" branch. Since Taproot can embed a script, you can have the Taproot pubkey be a 2-of-2 to implement the Scriptless Script "pointlocked" branch, then have a hidden script that lets you recover the funds with an OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY after the timeout if the seller does not claim the funds.)

Quantum Quibbles!

Now if you were really paying attention, you might have noticed this parenthetical:
(technical details: a Taproot output is 1 version byte + 32 byte public key, while a P2WPKH (bech32 singlesig) output is 1 version byte + 20 byte public key hash...)
So wait, Taproot uses raw 32-byte public keys, and not public key hashes? Isn't that more quantum-vulnerable??
Well, in theory yes. In practice, they probably are not.
It's not that hashes can be broken by quantum computes --- they're still not. Instead, you have to look at how you spend from a P2WPKH/P2PKH pay-to-public-key-hash.
When you spend from a P2PKH / P2WPKH, you have to reveal the public key. Then Bitcoin hashes it and checks if this matches with the public-key-hash, and only then actually validates the signature for that public key.
So an unconfirmed transaction, floating in the mempools of nodes globally, will show, in plain sight for everyone to see, your public key.
(public keys should be public, that's why they're called public keys, LOL)
And if quantum computers are fast enough to be of concern, then they are probably fast enough that, in the several minutes to several hours from broadcast to confirmation, they have already cracked the public key that is openly broadcast with your transaction. The owner of the quantum computer can now replace your unconfirmed transaction with one that pays the funds to itself. Even if you did not opt-in RBF, miners are still incentivized to support RBF on RBF-disabled transactions.
So the extra hash is not as significant a protection against quantum computers as you might think. Instead, the extra hash-and-compare needed is just extra validation effort.
Further, if you have ever, in the past, spent from the address, then there exists already a transaction indelibly stored on the blockchain, openly displaying the public key from which quantum computers can derive the private key. So those are still vulnerable to quantum computers.
For the most part, the cryptographers behind Taproot (and Bitcoin Core) are of the opinion that quantum computers capable of cracking Bitcoin pubkeys are unlikely to appear within a decade or two.
So:
For now, the homomorphic and linear properties of elliptic curve cryptography provide a lot of benefits --- particularly the linearity property is what enables Scriptless Script and simple multisignature (i.e. multisignatures that are just 1 signature onchain). So it might be a good idea to take advantage of them now while we are still fairly safe against quantum computers. It seems likely that quantum-safe signature schemes are nonlinear (thus losing these advantages).

Summary

I Wanna Be The Taprooter!

So, do you want to help activate Taproot? Here's what you, mister sovereign Bitcoin HODLer, can do!

But I Hate Taproot!!

That's fine!

Discussions About Taproot Activation

submitted by almkglor to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Don’t rant, you aren’t helping

When trying to get a person into crypto, you can’t take a ‘fiat bad, crypto good’ stance, it won’t work. People are tribal, and will jump to defend what they’re currently affiliated with if you give them any reason to act defensive.
Start off by asking if they have any problems with their current issues. Some key points that have worked well for me are:
  1. The fact you have to give away all the information someone needs to get money from your bank account any time to have to pay with a card.
  2. The long wait times for bank transactions.
  3. The steady inflation of our current system, making your money depreciate.
  4. The banks typically restrict your ability to take money out during a financial crisis
  5. Centralized control.
After you relate to them, present it as just something you think is really cool, not in a this-is-the-only-way maximalist method. At this point a lot of people will refer back to the crypto bubble at the start of 2018, calling it a scam. DO NOT GET DEFENSIVE, simply explain people were using it as a stock rather than a currency so that it lacked stability as well as being a massive bandwagon. Tell how it was healthy to get all the blind investors, who buy when they see green and dump when they see red, out of the way so that it could prosper under people who believe in the projects, not just the money.
If they show interest, tell them you’d be more then happy to help them get started and that they should talk to you about which coins are worth buying before making any decisions (you might have to explain theres more than Bitcoin at this point, do not over explain, just say there’s different coins with different goals creating a competitive market trying to offer users the best available currency). Leave it at that.
If you have any points you’d like to add to the list, let me know and I’ll edit it in. Sorry if the flair doesn’t really fit, there wasn’t an option I could see fitting better, but I wanted to get this out there so that people stop looking at us all like we’re crazy. Good luck everybody!
submitted by doom816 to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

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